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The Myth of the Clash of Civilizations: Confucian Values and Democratic Support
Abstract
Literature on political culture claims Confucianism is incompatible with modern liberal democratic values.
However, little empirical evidence has been presented to prove the validity of this statement. This paper
quantitatively studies the relationship between Confucian values and democratic support in East Asian
society and finds no negative correlation between the two.
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THE MYTH OF THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS: CONFUCIAN VALUES AND
DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT
Xinlin Xu

Abstract: Literatllre 011 political ctllttlre claims COlljilcianism is incompatible with modern liberal democratic vallies.

HOlVever, little empirical evidence has been pl�sellted to prove the validity ofthis statement. This paper qllalltitativefy
stlldies the re!atiollship beflve", Cotifllcian vallies and democratic support in EastAsian society andfinds 110 negative
concdatio!l benveen the iJvo.
INTRODUCTION
In Clash ofCivilizations, Samuel Huntington predicts that the post-Cold War world conflict
would be a clash between western liberal democratic ideals and the eastern traditions of
Confucianism and Islam. It has been taken for granted by many that Confucianistp is a hindrance to
democratic consolidation, and its emphasis on maintaining a hierarchical society is claimed to
promote social inequality. Li

(2012)

argues that the role-based society that Confucianism endorses

discourages individualism and represses individual spontaneity. Confucianism requires that each
person behave in accordance with his or her role in society. All these Confucian ideas are found to
contradict modern democratic ideologies. This leads to a question: should countries that have
Confucian traditions alter their historical roots for the sake of democratization and democratic
consolidation? To answer this question, one must fIrst determine the compatibility of Confucianism
and modern democratic values. Though scholars have researched this topic extensively through
analysis of Confucian texts, the lack of empirical studies makes it diffIcult to draw defmitive
conclusions.
This paper examines how Confucianism directly and indirectly influences support for
democracy at the individual level and fInds no negative correlation between the two, as Huntington
had predicted. Confucianism is deconstructed into Elitism, Familism, Preference for Harmony, and
Respect for Authority. Their corresponding effects on individuals' support for democracy are
explored. This research does not merely examine the Confucian texts alone, but rather focuses on
the Confucian principles that are practiced by the society. It tries to provide a new interpretation of
the role Confucianism plays in the development of political culture in modern and post-modern East
Asian society.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The prevailing assumption, articulated by Huntington in his Clash of the Civilizatiolls, is that
Confucian thought is inherently anti-democratic. He believes that maintaining order and respecting
hierarchy constitute the central tenets of Confucianism, and that these ideas repress the development
of individualism. Other researchers, including Chenyang Li, question the compatibility of democracy
and Confucianism as well. Li argues that Confucianism embraces both numerical and proportional
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equality. Numerical equality indicates that all human beings are endowed with the same capacity for
moral culrivation.l44 Moral equality does not imply that all people have the same starus; rather, it
dictates that people with the same roles, such as fathers and husbands, are given the same kind of
responsibilities and entitlements. Li calls such equality "role based numerical equality."145
Proportional equality, or "equality relative to people's due," is another fundamental principle in
Confucianism. According to this notion, some form of division of labor based on social stratification
is necessary. Confucianism promotes the concept of xial1, which means virtuous and talented. A
person with such qualities must be well educated and equipped with superb moral achievement,
consequently deserving high starus in society.146 Though advocating that everyone should have equal
opporrunities to be educated, Confucianism recognizes that only xian people could bear the
responsibility of managing a state. Li also argues that with Confucian proportional equality comes
political inequalities that contradict the fundamental values underlying modern democracy.14' Based
on this analysis, political Confucianism is theoretically incompatible with modern notions of political
equality.
Other scholars have a more positive attitude towards the compatibility between Confucianism
and democratic ideals. Fukuyama argues that Confucianism is relatively tolerant and has potential
egalitarian implications, in that everyone is entitled to receive equal opporrunity to cultivate himself
or herself into a virruous being.148 Chen also argues that Confucian values are compatible with
modern liberal democracy. She claims the Confucian practices of "personal cultivation ...and the
moral responsibility of the holders of power" can prevent the tendency of over-materialization of
modern society.14' In addition, He summarizes four ideal-type models of the relationship between
Confucianism and democracy: conflict, compatible, hybrid, and critical.150 He notes in the conflict
model that Confucianism lacks the concept of negative liberty, which is the freedom to act free of
exterior interferences. But he also argues that the conflict model overstates the negative role of
Confucianism and overlooks the possibility of compatibility, consequently downplaying the
likelihood of a Confucian contribution to democratization. However, he admits that empirically, the
conflict model was much more accurate than the compatibility model in the early stages of
democratization in East Asia.ls1

144 Li

2012, 297

145 Ibid., 299
14 6 Ibid., 306

147 Li 2012, 308
148 Fukuyama 1995,
149 Chen 2007, 211
150 He 2010, 19
151 Ibid.,

30

25
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Some scholars have conducted empirical research on Confucianism as well as on political
culture in East Asian countries. In Democratization in Conftlcian EastAsia, Zhengxu Wang (2007) argues
that citizens with stronger self-expression values are more likely to be critical citizens. He shows that
economic development and social modernization in Confucian Asia results in stronger self
expression values which in turn give rise to democratic citizenship in these societies. Wang does not
examine how self-expression tendencies are correlated with Confucianism, but he does raise the
important concept of self-expression values, which have played a non-negligible role in shaping civic
culture in Confucian societies. Another empirical study done by Qi (2008) finds that Confucian
values are negatively correlated with democratic support. However, this study did not unravel the
mechanism through which such negative effects took place. Moreover, this study did not deconstruct
Confucianism and investigate which doctrine or concept specifically undermined democratic support.
At this point, no research has been done to depict the exact mechanism through which
Confucian thought affects support for democracy at the individual level. This study aims to
empirically test this correlation as well as the mechanism through which Confucianism can indirectly
affect individuals' support for democracy.
RESEARCH DESIGN
This research employs a large-N statistical model using data from the Asian Barometer (AB)
Wave 2 conducted between 2004 and 2008. The analysis presented in this paper is from a set of
structural equation models (SEM) employing Maximum Likelihood. Variables are first set up in an
assumed causal sequence, with each variable being regressed on all variables that precede it in the
chain. A path model enables the test of direct correlations between a particular Confucian value and
individuals' support for democracy. It examines correlations suggested by existing political culture
theories--such as the social capital theory--that can indirectly affect democratic support. This model
requires the deconstruction of Confucianism into measurable variables. Confucianism covers a broad
range of topics, such as humanity, morality, governance, and etiquetre. This study is based on the
theoretical framework raised by Weiming Tu, which divides the ideology into two categories: political
Confucianism and Confucian personal ethics.
In order to measure Confucianism, one needs first to define every variable in the model.
Elitism is one of the most prominent doctrines in Confucianism. Bell describes elitism as the "rule of
the wise;" it exemplifies the ideal that "the best and the brightest" should exert more influence in
order to build a good society.152 Confucius claims: "In government, the secret is Integrity. Use it, and
you'll be like the polestar: always dwelling in its proper place the other stars tuming reverently about

152 Bell 2006, 157
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it."153 This statement shows that political Confucianism values the virtues of a ruler. The ruler shall
establish himself as a moral exemplar and shall be well educated. Moreover, by likening an ideal ruler
to a "polestar," Confucius affirms his belief in the centrality of the role rulers perform in state
management.
Confucianism is also governed by a fundamental principle of harmony. In the political realm,
Confucianism means a well-rounded sociopolitical order governed by Ii, which involves "the
behavior of persons related to each other in terms of role, status, rank, and position within a
structured society."154 Such a strong tendency towards conformity is characterized as one form of
Preference for Harmony. Another aspect that exemplifies this charactetistic is Confucian personal
ethics, which advocates litigation avoidance in solving private disputes. As recorded in TheAllalects:
"I can hear a court case as well as anyone. But we need to make a world where there's no reason for
a court case."155 Confucianism claims that if everyone in society has courtesy and treats others in a
benevolent and altruistic manner, then harmony can be maintained and no dispute will take place.
The Confucian personal ethic states that it is necessary to obey family elders, whose decisions
should be followed and respected. It also stresses that one's personal behavior must honor the
ancestors. These claims are conceptualized as Familism in this study. Confucian petsonal ethic
encourages a harmonious and cooperative society by stipulating strict moral codes regarding respect
that must be performed among people with different hierarchical status. Moreover, two notions of
self are clearly differentiated in the Confucian tradition: the small self and the great self. The small
self is the limited self. It operates as a force of inertia that resists further development. The great
self, on the other hand, goes beyond self-centeredness. It not only relates to the family, dle society,
the state, and beyond to the world at large, but also establishes these relationships as "part of its own
sensitivity and concern."156 In other words, familism embodies a certain degree of self-sacrifice when
conflicts rise between personal and family interests.
The Confucian ideology also promotes a role-based society, where everyone has his or her
own entidements and responsibilities, according to which each individual acquires his or her due
equality. Confucius specifies five relationships: rulers and subjects, fathers and sons, husbands and
wives, elder and younger brothers, and finally friends and friends. He maintains that if individuals
observe these relationships properly, the society will stabilize itself. This observation of social
hierarchy is conceptualized as Respect for Authority.
When studying the correlation between political culture and democracy, it is worth examining
the social capital theory, which integrates sociology and economics to study civic tradition as well as
153 Confucius 1998, 11
154 Schwartz 1985, 67
155 Confucius and Hinton 1998, 132
156Tu
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political dynamics. In other words, besides direct correlations, Confucian values may affect
democratic support at the inclividual level through other mechanisms suggested by literature on
political culture. Social capital theorists have shown that social trust and democratic consolidation are
positively correlated.157 Inglehart argues that social trust is essential for people to view political
opponents as a loyal opposition and is strongly correlated with stable democracy.l58 Coleman (1988)
contends that a system of mutual trust is an important form of social capital through which future
obligations and expectations may be based. Regarding social trust, Putman draws a clistinction
between "thick trust," which is "embedded in personal relations," and "thin trust," which extends to
other people within the community. Though this clichotomy has been criticized for failing to
characterize the complexity of social trust in the real world, it is especially appropriate for stuclies
East Asian countries. Qi argues that Confucian personal ethics encourage people to "pursue interests
and seek social exchanges" within "in-groups"l59 where the "thick trust" applies. She also finds that,
in countries influenced by Confucianism, such particular trust is negatively correlated with general
interpersonal trust in society.I GO Therefore, this study will also incorporate General Trust as an
intervening variable to test whether Confucian values indirectly influence democratic support by
altering social capital.
Another concept raised by Inglehart is the postmaterialist value, which emboclies tolerance,
quality of life, self-expression, intellectual and aesthetic needs, etc.IGI He finds that postmaterialist
values contribute to people's declining confidence in hierarchical institutions, which in turn
strengthen their support for democracy.lG2 This theory has been confirmed in Wang's study on
democratization in Confucian East Asian countries. Based on this study, I incorporated Self
Expression values as another intervening variable. By influencing this variable, Confucian values
could possibly have an indirect impact on individuals' support for democracy. In measuring self
expression values, I extracted the elements comparatively relevant to democratic support.
Individuals' interest in and willingness to participate in politics is used as an indicator of the level of
self-expression values; individuals' potential for civil disobedience is another. John Rawls defines civil
clisobeclience as "politically-motivated, public, non-violent and conscientious breach of law
undertaken with the aim of bringing about a change in laws or government policies."IG3 Civil
clisobeclience is a call to conscience when no other means of self-expression is found adequate or

157 Inglehart 1997;
158 Inglehart 1997,
159 Qi 2008, 9

Putnam 1993 and 2000; Fukuyama 1995; Newton 2001
172-173

lGOIbid.,17-19
161 Inglehart 1997,109-130
162 Ibid., 299
163 Rawls,1971
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satisfactory. Therefore, the level of one's potential for civil disobedience reflects one's aspiration for
liberty and inclination to act in self-defense through public expression.
Democracy is a concept that resists attempts to objectively define. Schmitter and Karl
recapitulate nine "procedural minimum" conditions for democracy,l64 while Whitehead argues that all
definitions of democracy are contextually based.165 However, regardless of the definitions of
democracy, there is a consensus on the liberal political ideal that laid the foundation of democracy.
The ideal of liberty claims that all men are born equal, and as a result, they all have natural rights to
life, to property, and to civil freedoms of association. All individuals are equally entitled to exercise
the rights listed above, irrespective of their sex, race, religion, or political views. As implied by liberal
democratic ideals, political equality is a prereqnisite for modern democracy. Though unequal
distribution of political resources poses the question of whether political equality can be realized or
not, the goal of political equality still has its intrinsic merits.166 On the surface, the Confucian idea of
proportional equality, which implies that virtuous people should run the government, conflicts with
the modern ideal of political equality. Proportional equality resembles Dahl's concept of
guardianship, which states that only qualified elites can govern for the common good.167 Dahl argues
that guardians who make moral judgments based on the "science of ruling" and the knowledge of the
general good misunderstand the relationship between private and collective interests. Individuals who
give consent to guardianship based on economic performance are regarded as having lower levels of
democratic support.
I synthesized the literature on Confucianism and incorporated social capital and post
materialist theory to hypothesize a path model that depicts the mechanism by which Confucianism
generates impact on democratic support at the individual level. The final model of the correlation
between Confucian values and support for democracy in East Asia will be obtained by dropping all
the paths that show insignificant correlations. The selection of countries covers China, South Korea,
Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. The reason I chose these cases is because my study is confmed to
East Asian countries. All these countries or regions either have had Confucianism as their offlcial
religion, such as South Korea and Japan, or are occupied by population that is culturally rooted in
Confucianism, such as Hong Kong and Taiwan.168
The hypotheses I proposed are outlined in Table

1 below.

Elitism, Respect for Authority,

Familism, and Preference for Harmony are exogenous variables, and the covariances between the
variables are represented by two-ended arrows. Causal relations between variables are represented by

164 Schmitter and Karl, 1991,
165 Whitehead 2002, 26

81-82

Dahl 2006, 36 and 84
53
168 Lew, Wang and Choi, 2001; Nosco, 1997

166

167 Ibid.,
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unidirectional arrows. The unexplained effects are represented by error 1, 2 and 3. In this model,
direct correlations between every single Confucian value and support for democracy are assumed.
Further, direct correlations between Confucian values and General Trust as well as Self-Expression
Values are also represented. The total effect that Confucianism has on democratic support is thus
calculated by adding up the direct and indirect effects.
Figure 1: Hypotheses

Elitism

Repseet for Authority

Familism

Harmony

MEASUREMENT AND OPERATIONALIZATIO
Table 1: Measurement of Variables

Variable

Measurement

Elitism

•

•

Description

"We should get rid of parliament and
elections and have a strong leader decide

For both statements, respondents

things."

disagree/ disapprove" were coded
as 1) "disagree/disapprove" as 2,

"People with little or no education should
have as much say in politics as highly
educated people."

choosing "strongly

"agree/ approve" as 3, and
"strongly agree/approve" as 4. The
sum score stands for the level of
elitism. The higher the score, the
higher the level of elitism.

Respect for

•

Authoriry
•

"Being a student, one should not question

Same as above. The higher the

the authority of their teacher."

score, the higher the level of
respect for authority.

"Government leaders are like the head of a
family; we should all follow their
decisions."

Familism

•

"For the sake of the family, the individual
should put his personal interests second."

•

"Even if parents' demands are
unreasonable, children still should do what
they ask."

Same as above.
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Preference

•

for
Harmony

Out-group
trust

"When one has a conflict with a neighbor,

Same as above.

the best way to deal with it is to
accommodate the other person."
•

"If people have too many different ways of
thinking, society will be chaotic."

•

"Generally speaking, would you say most
people can be trusted or that you must be

For the first question, "you must be

very careful in dealing with people?"

was coded as 1, "most people can
be trusted" as 2. For the second

•

"How much trust do you have in other
people you interact with?"

very careful in dealing with people"

question, "none at all" was coded
as 1, "not very much trust" as 2,
"quite a lot trust" as 3, and "'a great
deal of trust" as 4. The sum score
of these two questions indicates the
level of out-group trust.

Self
Expression
Values

•

"How interested would you say you are in
politics?"

•

"If possible, I don't want to get involved in
political matters."

•

"Citizens should always obey laws and
regulations, even if they disagree with
them."

For the first question, "not at all
interested" was coded as 1, "not
very interested" as 2, "somewhat
interested" as 3, and "very
interested" as 4. For the second and
third statements, "strongly agree"
was coded as 1, "somewhat agree"
as 2, "somewhat disagree" as 3, and
"strongly disagree" as 4. The sum
of these three scores stands for the
level of self-expression values.

Support for
democracy

•

•

"If you had to choose between democracy
and economic development, which would
you say is more important?"
''Which of the following statements comes
closest to your own opinion?"

For the flrst question, "economic
development is definitely more
important" was coded as 1)
"somewhat more important" as 2,
"equally important" as 3,
"democracy is somewhat more
important" as 4, and "democracy is
definitely more important" as 5.
For the second question, "it does
not matter whether we have a
democracy or not" was coded as 1,
"under some circumstances, an
authoritarian government can be
preferable" as 2, and "democracy is
always preferable" as 3. The sum
score of these two questions
indicates level of support for
democracy.

Source: Asian Barometer Wave 2
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A reduced model, which shows the correlations between variables, was produced by
dropping all the insignificant paths in the original one. The path coefficients are shown above each
arrow. The RMSEA is .017, which is smaller than the .05 required for a good model. Therefore, the
goodness of fit measure supports the adequacy of this model. The Chi-squire is not used here to test
the adequacy of this model. First, the finding of significance in the likelihood ratio test of a path
model can occur even with very small differences of the model-implied and observed covariance
metrics, especially given the large-N of the samples in this study, which is 9,813. Moreover, since
Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) tends to inflate Chi-square, RMSEA, an indicator less
influenced by sample size is used to measure the goodness of fit of this model.
Figure 2: Reduced Model

Elitism

Repseet for Authority

Familism

Harmony

Note: Comparative fit index

=

0.986; root mean square error of approximation (Rl\1SEA) = 0.017; 99 percent

confidence interval for RMSEA = 0.011-0.024; N=9813, Chi-square=28, p<O.OOOl.

Table 2:

Total Effects of Confucian Values on Democratic Attitudes
Elitism

Self-Expression
Trust
Democracy

Authority

Familism

Self-Expression

Harmony

Trust

.079

.056

.095

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

-.029

.000

.000

.000

.065

.009

.014

.162

.020

.061

In the model, no direct correlation is found between Respect for Authority, Familism and
Support for Democracy. Familism is found to be negatively correlated with General Trust, which
confirms Qi's finding that interpersonal trust in East Asian countries tends to undermine general
social trust. This model also confirms the social capital theory, which states that social trust promotes
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democratic governance. The model does not fInd any direct negative correlation between the four
sets of Confucian values and Self-Expression Values. On the contrary, Elitism, Familism and Respect
for Authority are found to contribute to Self-Expression Values. In this model, Preference for
Harmony neither contributes to nor undermines General Trust or Self-Expression Values, but
exhibits a positive correlation with Support for Democracy. The total effects are calculated by adding
the direct effects, association of one variable with another free from other intervening paths, and
indirect effects, association of one variable with another mediated through other variables in the
model. As shown in Table 2, the net effects the four values have on democratic support are all
positive according to this model, with Self-Expression Values affecting Support for Democracy most
signifIcantly.
Familism undermines Support for Democracy by reducing out-group trust, but the net effect
of Familism on Support for Democracy is nonetheless positive. Furthermore, none of the four sets
of Confucian values are found, directly or indirectly, to undermine democratic support at the
individual level.
CONCLUSIONS
No negative correlation between Confucian values and democratic support is found in this
study. On the contrary, a positive correlation, negligible as it is, is presented in the model. Therefore,
this study does not support the claim made in the Clash of Civilizations stating that a major conflict
exists between Confucian values and democracy. With the small path coeffIcients, this study neither
supports the claim that Confucian values could positively contribute to individuals' democratic
support. However, this study refutes cultural arguments against Confucianism regarding
democratization or democratic consolidation.
The constitutional liberties in modern democratic countries, such as freedom of speech and
religion, belong to negative liberty, which designates rights that can be exercised free from
interference. However, the correlativity of rights and duties dictates that rights and duties are just two
sides of a same concept. Confucianism rarely stipulates positive duties people have towards one
another; rather, it mostly enumerates negative duties, which are actions people shall refrain from
doing for the benefIt of others. To say A has a duty not to act in a certain way towards B is the same
as saying that B has a right over A's not acting in that way. TheAnalects says, "Never impose on
others what you would not choose for yourself."l6' If each individual in the society attaches
signifIcant importance to self-autonomy, then everyone else has a duty not to interfere with this
preference as long as it does not do harm to others. Culture is not stagnant, but rather constantly

169

Confucius 1998, 176
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evolving and opening to new interpretation. Confucianism, it appears, is flexible enough to
accommodate new perspectives.
One cannot simply conclude a particular culture is pro-authoritarian or will foster the gtowth
of democratic ideas. Empirically, no evidence is found that Confucianism is incompatible with
democratic support. Future research should focus on whether institutions established based on
Confucian values or practices inherited from Confucian traditions have played a role in hindering
democratization or democratic consolidation.
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APPENDICES
Regression Weights

Trust

Estimate

S.E.

CR.

P

<---

Familism

-.011

.004

-2.584

.010

Self-Expression <---

Familism

.093

.012

7.481

***

Self-Expression <---

Authority

.073

.017

4.287

***

Self-Expression <---

Elitism

.229

.038

6.018

***

Democracy

<---

Trust

.113

.023

4.950

***

Democracy

<---

Self-Expression

.117

.010

12.223

***

Democracy

<---

Harmony

.022

.013

1.669

.095

Democracy

<---

Elitism

.109

.025

4.323

***

Stan darelize d RegresslOn

OJg! ts

Estimate
Familism

-.029

Self-Expression <---

Familism

.095

Self-Expression <---

Authority

.056

Self-Expression <---

Elitism

.079

Trust

<---

Democracy

<---

Trust

.061

Democracy

<---

Self-Expression

.162

Democracy

<---

Harmony

.020

Democracy

<---
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